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Abstract
This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which the natural resource curse can
operate. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden
of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The
theory is tested using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan
countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents, taxation and election
proximity. It is found that an increase in natural resource rents decreases perceived tax
enforcement, which in turn reduces the demand for regular, open and honest elections.
Results are robust to alternative speci￿cations. A supplementary analysis reveals that,
consistent with the two-period model proposed, the e⁄ects are more acute closer to national
elections. The ￿ndings support political-economy explanations of how natural resources
a⁄ect economies, in which resource rents are purported to in￿ uence the decisions of the
political elite through increased returns to staying in power.
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11 Introduction
From 1965 to 2000, cumulative oil revenues in Nigeria amounted to $350 billion at 1995 prices.
In 1970, per capita GDP was $245, and the poverty rate, measured as the share of the population
subsisting on less than $1 a day, was around 40 percent. Oil revenues per capita were $33. In
2000, per capita GDP was the same; the poverty rate was just under 70 percent. Oil revenues
per capita were $325.1
Sachs and Warner (1995) show that resource-rich countries grow more slowly than others; the
importance of understanding why, how and when this occurs is clear. In this paper, I propose
and test a mechanism linking increasing rents from natural resource exploitation with a decrease
in the demand for political accountability through a reduced burden of taxation on citizens.
The ￿nding contributes to a growing body of literature on the natural resource curse. Early
explanations presented largely economic channels, most notably the Dutch Disease, whereby
natural resource booms lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, reducing competitive-
ness in more productive export sectors and, as a result, TFP growth (Corden and Neary, 1982;
Krugman, 1987). Models of rent-seeking are also used to explain the phenomenon: Torvik (2002)
shows how allocative distortion can reduce growth when entrepreneurs depart from productive
activities to engage in rent-seeking, and Tornell and Lane (1999) show how, in economies con-
taining a concentration of powerful groups and a lack of institutional strength, revenue shocks
reduce growth.
More recent cross-country observations from Mehlum et al (2006) suggest that a more political
mechanism is at play: the deleterious impact of natural resources on growth is stronger in
countries with weak institutions. The ￿nding supports political-economy explanations of the
resource curse posited by, for example, Robinson et al (2006), who show how resource booms
create dysfunctional state behaviour in the presence of bad institutions.
Empirical evidence of the speci￿c mechanisms through which resource booms can lead to a
curse is relatively sparse. Macro-level studies show that resources have a detrimental impact on
institutions through waste and corruption (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003); they increase
the likelihood of civil war (Collier and Hoe› er, 2002); and they reduce measures of democracy
1Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)
2(Barro, 1999). Research using micro-level data ￿nds evidence of more speci￿c mechanisms: using
an oil discovery announcement in Sªo TomØ and Pr￿ncipe, Vicente (2010) shows that resources
increase corruption through vote buying, customs, and the allocation of scholarships; Caselli and
Michaels (2009) analyse a Brazilian oil discovery, ￿nding that oil money has little, if any, impact
on households ￿it largely ￿ goes missing￿as it passes through administrators.
This paper speci￿cally contributes to the literature on micro-level empirical mechanisms. I
propose that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, the political elite lowers the burden
of taxation on citizens in order to reduce accountability. This reduction in accountability leads to
the resource curse in democracies (Collier and Hoe› er, 2009). The mechanism is consistent with
theories presented by Robinson et al (2006) and Caselli and Cunningham (2009), who explain
that natural resource rents alter the behaviour of the political elite through increasing the value
of being in power, leading to an increase in resources spent on power-preserving activities and a
misallocation of resources in the rest of the economy.
To test this, I use a cross-country representative household survey sample of over 50,000
observations taken in 33 survey rounds across 15 nascent democracies in sub-Saharan Africa from
2001-2006. I use data on the demand for democratic accountability ￿which I interpret as the
strength of respondents￿preferences for regular, open and honest elections ￿and on perceived
tax enforcement, which is used to measure the tax burden on citizens in the absence of data
on tax payments at the individual level and of aggregate data on tax revenues for the sample
country-years. Data on annual natural resource rents are at the country level. I hypothesise
that resource rents decrease perceptions of tax enforcement, which in turn reduces the demand
for accountability. As the latter relationship is likely to exhibit endogeneity, the identi￿cation
strategy lends itself to an Instrumental Variable (IV) two-stage least squares approach, where the
demand for accountability is the dependant variable, tax enforcement is the endogenous regressor,
and a measure of resource rents is used as the exogenous instrument. I include country ￿xed
e⁄ects to control for time-invariant country-level correlates. That the data is at the individual
level facilitates the estimation of the second, inherently micro-level, relationship, as well as the
inclusion of numerous demographic and economic variables to control for otherwise unexplained
variation in the model.
I ￿nd clear and signi￿cant evidence in support of the hypothesis. Increases in resource
3rents lower perceived tax enforcement, which itself is a signi￿cant predictor of the demand for
accountability (a one point increase in tax enforcement raises the demand for accountability by
just under a third of a point. Both are measured on four-point scales). Moreover, suggestive
evidence is given in support of a negative relationship between a variety of aggregate tax measures
and resource rents, providing external corroboration. Results are robust to alternative measures
of the demand for democratic accountability, the exclusion of outliers and various alternative
speci￿cations. The use of resource rents as an instrument is justi￿ed by tests for overidentifying
restrictions, where measures of aid are used as additional instruments.
Further to the primary estimation strategy, I explore a testable implication of the theory: that
the e⁄ect of rents on tax enforcement is more acute closer to an election, or, phrased alternatively,
that the e⁄ect of election proximity on tax enforcement is signi￿cant in the presence of high
resource rents. This is supported by the data ￿the manipulation of tax enforcement in order to
preserve power is a phenomenon that expressly concerns resource-rich countries. Taken together,
the results are consistent with political-economy explanations of the natural resource curse, in
which resource rents are purported to a⁄ect the decisions of the political elite through increased
returns to staying in power.
The paper is organised as follows. First I contextualise the proposed relationships and present
a simple model of leader behaviour. I then discuss the estimation strategy and the data used for
the analysis, before examining the results and ￿nally o⁄ering some concluding remarks.
2 On The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse
In this paper I propose that dysfunctional leader behaviour in the presence of resource rents
can be observed through an attenuation of the tax burden on citizens, e⁄ected with a view to
decreasing the demand for accountability in order to stay in power.
2.1 The Political Resource Curse
The idea that resources a⁄ect leader behaviour is central to Robinson et al (2006). Resource
booms increase the value of being in power and also provide politicians with the means to
in￿ uence elections. Where checks and balances are weak, the political incentives generated by
4the boom will result in a misallocation of resources in the economy. The nature of these incentives
is the key to determining whether or not the boom will result in a curse.
Collier and Hoe› er (2004) provide empirical evidence that resource booms increase the value
of being in power. Increases in resource rents signi￿cantly raise the likelihood of coups and civil
wars as the returns to being in power augment. That democracy su⁄ers in the presence of high
resource rents is also a well supported proposition; Barro (1999) and Tsui (2005) each make
the observation using cross-country data. The empirical literature also supports the suggestion
that perverse political incentives are fostered by resource booms. Vicente (2010), Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) and, to a lesser extent, Caselli and Michaels (2009) show that natural
resources increase corruption. The proposition that the nature of political incentives created
by resource booms determines whether or not a curse will prevail is strongly reinforced by the
relationships identi￿ed in Mehlum et al (2006) ￿that curses occur where institutions are weak
(i.e. where low checks and balances produce rapacious political incentives) and not where they
are strong.
2.2 Natural Resources, Taxation and Accountability
While several remarks on the relationship between resource rents, taxation and the demand
for accountability are present in the literature, an empirical analysis of the entire mechanism
appears to be absent. As such, it is useful to look at each link separately before formalising the
relationship in full.
Bornhorst et al (2009) o⁄er the most recent and detailed cross-country evidence of an o⁄set
between natural resource revenues and revenues from other domestic sources. They ￿nd that a
1% increase in the former lowers non-resource revenues by about 0.2%. Although a reduction
in public scrutiny of government is mentioned as a possible consequence, the authors refrain
from identifying a speci￿c explanation for the o⁄set. Collier (2006, pp. 1484) also discusses the
relationship, referring to IMF data that, on average, shows no discernible di⁄erence in government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP between resource-rich and resource-poor African countries.2
His explanation is that ￿the governments of oil economies do not spend more, they tax less.￿
The political science literature is replete with allusions to the concept of taxation as a tool
2See IMF (2009; Table SA11) for an up-to-date version of this table.
5for engaging citizens; for increasing scrutiny and the demand for accountability. A recent book
by Brautigam et al (2008) discusses at length the role of taxation in the formation of democratic
states. It is argued that taxation is an integral part of the social contract that increases rep-
resentation in and scrutiny of government. Indeed much of the literature on the relationship is
framed in the context of the mechanism analysed in this paper. In proposing a theory to explain
that rentier states3 do not foster democracy, Ross (2001, pp. 332) argues that:
￿[...] governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might oth-
erwise lead to demands for greater accountability [...] when governments derive
su¢ cient revenues from the sale of oil, they are likely to tax their populations less
heavily or not at all, and the public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability
from ￿and representation in ￿their government.￿
Two case studies are used to support this. Crystal (1990) observes that the governments of
Kuwait and Qatar were made less accountable to the traditional merchant class by oil discoveries,
and Brand (1992) argues that decreases in foreign aid and remittances in 1980s Jordan led to
greater demand for political representation.4
The study closest in spirit to this one is perhaps Collier and Hoe› er (2009), who o⁄er a
theoretical explanation of the mechanism as part of a wider analysis of the e⁄ect of resource
rents on growth across di⁄erent polities. They argue that the lower tax rate imposed as a result
of higher rents facilitates the embezzlement of rents as well as the provision of resources for
patronage due to its ruinous e⁄ects on scrutiny from citizens. This is used to explain their
cross-country empirical ￿nding: natural resource rents reduce growth in democracies with weak
accountability. Indeed Collier also writes in an earlier paper (2006, pp. 1484):
￿Scrutiny of government is a public good, the supply of which is commonly provoked
by the tax burden. The lack of scrutiny in countries with large resource rents makes
it easier for public revenues to be diverted into patronage [...] resource rents subvert
democracy by making patronage politics ￿nancially feasible.￿
3Rentier states are de￿ned by Mehdavy (1970, pp. 428) as those ￿that receive on a regular basis substantial
amounts of external rent.￿
4The link between rents, taxes and accountability is also discussed at length by, inter alia, Herb (2003) and
Moore (2004). However, the state of the literature on rentier behaviour is perhaps best captured by Chaudhry
(1997; pp. 187), who notes that ￿theories of the rentier state far outstrip detailed empirical analysis of actual
cases.￿
6It is also worth noting that this e⁄ect has recently received attention from policy-makers
(Devarajan et al, 2010). Thus, the idea that resource rents mollify citizens￿scrutiny through a
decreased burden of taxation is not a new one. Below, I formalise the theory before o⁄ering an
empirical test of its implications.
2.3 Theory
In the spirit of Vicente (2010), I propose to explain a speci￿c channel through which the natural
resource curse can operate. I build on a very simple two-period framework developed by Caselli
and Cunningham (2009), where leader utility is partially determined by a standard survival
function, i.e. the reduced-form probability of retaining power.5 The increased returns to power-
preserving activities caused by high resource rents will alter the behaviour of leaders in accordance
with the incentives produced by the survival function. The authors therefore explore the e⁄ects
of resource rents on leader behaviour under various assumptions of survival determination. For
example, the ￿ repressive leader￿emerges where survival is determined by repressive spending; the
￿ fatalistic leader￿emerges where it is negatively determined by resource rents, and so on.
Here, I suggest that citizens are provoked into demanding accountability by the taxation of
non-resource GDP (as discussed above). This increased demand for accountability diminishes the
prospects of re-election for a leader engaged in resource embezzlement or patronage. It follows
that the reduced-form probability of survival ￿ is a function of taxation ￿, where ￿0(￿) < 0 and
￿ 2 [0;1]. First period leader consumption is comprised of exogenous rents ￿. Second period
consumption is comprised again of ￿ along with revenue collected from non-resource GDP ￿￿,
subject to survival of probability ￿(￿). The objective function is thus:




= ￿0(￿)[￿ + ￿￿] + ￿(￿)￿; (2)
5As in Caselli and Cunningham (2009), the term ￿ leader￿is broadly construed as the political elite.
7total di⁄erential:






￿00(￿)(￿ + ￿￿) + 2￿0(￿)￿
: (4)
By the second order condition, the second term in brackets in (3) must be non-positive. It
follows that the denominator in (4) is non-positive. As the numerator is negative by de￿nition, I
can thus conclude that d￿
d￿ < 0; in other words, where survival is determined by taxation, leaders
will decrease the tax burden on citizens as resource rents increase.6
3 Estimation
I test the theory by analysing two speci￿c propositions: that resource rents decrease the extent
to which citizens are taxed ( d￿
d￿ < 0), and that the extent to which citizens are taxed a⁄ects their
demand for democratic accountability (i.e. a test of the reduced form ￿0(￿) < 0, as discussed
above).
3.1 Identi￿cation
To investigate the nature of these relationships, I use data collected in rounds 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3
of the Afrobarometer, a series of standardised, nationally representative public opinion surveys
conducted in nascent sub-Saharan democracies.7 The sample of 50,755 is drawn from 33 sur-
veys conducted between 2001 and 2006 in 15 countries: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia. As I include country ￿xed e⁄ects in the analysis, the sample is restricted to countries
in which the questions of interest were asked in more than one round. As in Eifert et al (2010),
6Whereas this model shows how rational leader behaviour can lead to lower taxes where resource rents are
higher, it does not in and of itself prove that this behaviour leads to the natural resource curse (i.e. reduced
growth). Recall that Collier and Hoe› er (2009) show that weakened accountability (argued to be caused by a
lower tax burden) has a detrimental e⁄ect on the economic performance of resource-rich democracies. A key point
here is that, should any positive e⁄ect of lower taxes on non-resource GDP v exist, it will be more than o⁄set by
the deleterious e⁄ects of weak accountability in the presence of natural resources.
7Samples are drawn through a multi-stage strati￿ed, clustered sampling procedure; sample sizes are su¢ cient
to yield a margin of error of percentage points at the 95% con￿dence level. Further information on Afrobarometer
methodology is provided by Bratton, Mattes and Gymah-Boadi (2004).
8the loss of data (in this case two countries) is more than compensated by the methodological
bene￿ts of including country ￿xed e⁄ects. Additional constraints are imposed by the absence of
the relevant questions in the 12 ￿rst-round surveys.
The two questions of interest involve respondents attributing a subjective score to a state-
ment or question. The dependent variable comes from a standard question designed to gauge
respondents￿preferences for democratic, accountable governance:
I would like to hear your views about how this country is governed. Which of the
following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.
A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest
elections.
B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for
choosing this country￿ s leaders.
The respondents are probed for the strength of their opinion, which are subsequently coded
on a four-point scale ranging from agree very strongly with A to agree very strongly with B.8 The
signi￿cant advantage of this question is that the variation in respondents￿subjective concept of
elections is minimised by the inclusion of the ￿regular, open and honest￿ quali￿er and, most
importantly, by the country ￿xed e⁄ects framework, which controls for time-invariant country-
speci￿c characteristics such as colonial history, ethnic heterogeneity and level of economic and
institutional development. In addition, one can safely assume that the alternative choice ￿the
￿other methods￿￿is highly unlikely to capture any preference for democratic accountability, es-
pecially given that colonial and/or autocratic rule constitute the most salient alternative methods
of governance to most Africans.
The taxation variable is based on individuals￿subjective measurement of income tax enforce-
ment:
How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a
person like yourself did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned?
8I recode responses so that the variable increases with the demand for accountability.
9Values are labelled on a four point scale, ranging from not at all likely to very likely. The
variable is used to measure the extent to which leaders are directly taxing the citizenry. Alter-
native methods of capturing the tax burden are limited: measures of individual tax payments
are not included in the survey; the availability of data on tax revenues for the sample country-
years is severely limited (I use an extended dataset in Figure 1, discussed below), as are data on
tax rates, though I would argue that the latter two are less appropriate measures than the one
used, given that they are aggregated to the country level. Moreover, the enforcement of taxa-
tion can be reasonably assumed to be administratively more malleable than tax rates, making it
more consistent with the theory. Again, concerns that initial country-level institutional variation
in￿ uence results are mitigated by the inclusion of country ￿xed e⁄ects in the econometric model.
Nevertheless, and as with many survey-based studies, signi￿cant methodological issues re-
main. As answers to the above questions are given in a speci￿c context, it is necessary to control
for potentially confounding factors that could in￿ uence responses. With this in mind, I include
controls for characteristics of the interview (whether other people were present during ques-
tioning) and the interviewer (age, education, gender, rural-urban background). As mentioned,
contextual factors that are correlated with the country in which the interview takes place are
controlled for, as are survey round-speci￿c features. I also include a control for the proximity of
the survey to a national election, together with a linear time trend control.
In addition to context-speci￿c variation, subjective survey responses are also prone to bias.
It is plausible that one￿ s inclination to express their preferences for democratically accountable
governance ￿or indeed to convey the impression that income tax is weakly enforced ￿varies
somewhat according to both the social norms of their country and to their suspicions of the
enumerator￿ s a¢ liation. For example, a downward bias in the responses could be expected
where such opinions are frowned upon. The possibility of this is assuaged by both the con￿dential
and private manner in which the Afrobarometer is conducted and by the independence of the
enumerators, who were not a¢ liated with the government or any political party. That the
presence of other people during interviews is controlled for will also reduce the possibility of bias.
Where the bias is symptomatic of a nation￿ s social norms, the country ￿xed e⁄ects framework will
control for these di⁄erences. As is standard in studies of this nature, respondents￿demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics (including age, economic status ￿measured using an index
10comprised of respondents￿ access to food, water, fuel for cooking and healthcare during the
preceding year ￿education, gender and rural-urban background) are also controlled for.
As these data stem from repeated cross-sections rather than from a panel, it is possible that
sampling variation accounts for some of the observed changes between rounds. However, the
combination of large nationally representative surveys (mean survey size is 1538.03 respondents)
and the consistency of the sampling methodology used by Afrobarometer across rounds indicate
that this may not be a signi￿cant problem. Nevertheless, I include controls for survey rounds
(1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3) in the estimations.
Endogeneity is another concern in a survey-based analysis such as this. It is possible that
either one￿ s demand for accountability may have a causal in￿ uence on their perception of tax
enforcement, or that other factors simultaneously a⁄ect both responses. In such a case, the
reported relationship would be spurious. To overcome this, I instrument the potentially endoge-
nous tax variable with the exogenous resource rents variable. This approach is in line with the
theory, and allows a clear test of the proposed links. Of course, the validity of the approach is
dependent on the satisfaction of the usual restrictions: that the instrument is directly related
to the endogenous variable and is independent of the error term. I show that this is the case in
Section 4.
The resource rents measurement is taken from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indi-
cators (WDI). It was initially developed by Collier and Hoe› er (2009), who de￿ne rents as the
di⁄erence between the resource price and the extraction costs.9 They then multiply the unit rent
by the total volume extracted. Rents are added for a variety of resources and are then divided
by GDP. The resources used in this paper are crude oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, copper, iron,
lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and wood.10 The measure is particularly accu-
rate as, although commodity prices vary over time but are constant across countries, extraction
costs vary over time and across countries. It thus precisely captures the value for which cruder
resource-revenue measurements were hitherto used as proxies.
9The measurements are based on sources and methods from Kunte et al (1998).
10Wood rents, coded as net forest depletion in the WDI, are calculated as the product of unit resource rents
and the excess of roundwood harvest over natural growth. It has been pointed out that as forests have an open
access problem, one could argue that poor property rights and bad management could lead to overharvesting,
which would decrease unit rents. To assauge the potential resultant endogeneity of the variable, I check that
results are robust to the exclusion of the wood component in the rents variable (unreported).
11The main speci￿cation is as follows: I use an IV (two-stage least squares) method to estimate
the causal links between resources rents, perceived tax enforcement, and the demand for demo-
cratic accountability of individual respondent i living in country c taking part in survey round
s during period t. I express the two-stage relationship as:
Ticst = aT + ￿Rct + X0
icst￿T + C0
ct￿T + S0
st T + uicst (5)
and
Dicst = aD + ’Ticst + X0
icst￿D + C0
ct￿D + S0
st D + eicst (6)
where T is the measure of tax enforcement; R is resource rents; X is a vector of individual
covariates including age, economic status, education, gender, rural-urban background and inter-
view controls; C is a vector of country-related controls, namely country dummies and an election
proximity variable; S is a vector of temporal controls, comprised of a linear time trend and survey
round dummies; D is the demand for democratic accountability; and ’ explains the relationship
between T and the dependent variable D. Throughout the analysis, ￿ and ’ are the coe¢ cients
of interest, where ￿ is predicted to be negative and ’ positive.
3.1.1 Rents, Taxes and Survival
In addition to the main analysis, I explore another testable implication of the theory using data
on the proximity of electoral competition. As outlined above, the role of the ￿ survival function￿
￿the reduced-form probability of retaining power ￿is a key concept in the political explanations
of resource curse mechanisms. As elections are likely to determine the survival or otherwise of
leaders, I propose that dysfunctional leader behaviour in the presence of high resource rents is
likely to intensify as elections draw nearer.
I test this proposition by introducing an election proximity model to the analysis. I hypoth-
esise that the e⁄ects of an approaching election on tax enforcement will be negative as resource
rents increase. This is tested by including a simple interaction variable between rents and election
proximity in the following:
Ticst = ￿T + ￿Rct + ￿Ect + ￿(Rct ￿ Ect) + ￿TCc + X0
icst￿T + S0
st T + vicst (7)
12where E is election proximity, de￿ned as the absolute value in months between a survey round
and the most proximate national elections ￿parliamentary or presidential. I follow Eifert et
al (2010) by multiplying the values by -1 for ease of interpretation: elections are closer as the
variable increases. As such, I expect ￿ to have a negative sign, signifying that, in resource rich
countries (i.e. as rents increase), leaders reduce tax enforcement as an election approaches.
3.2 Data
Table 1 gives a summary of the main dependant variable used in the analysis, showing the
percentage of responses attributed to each of the four points on the Likert scale for all 33 survey
rounds, together with means and standard deviations. In Table 2 I present more sample statistics,
including mean tax enforcement scores and resource rent data used in the IV estimations. Two
potentially problematic issues are evident here: ￿rst, some countries (Namibia, Nigeria and South
Africa) are represented by three survey rounds in the sample, whereas all other countries feature
twice; and, second, Nigeria has particularly high resource rent levels that could bias overall
results.11 To mitigate the ￿rst problem, I use population weights (de￿ned as 1
nc, where ncis the
total number of observations from that country) that control for over-representation. For the
second, I exclude Nigerian data from the analysis as a robustness check.
4 Results
4.1 External Corroboration
Before turning to more formal analysis, I begin in Figure 1 by supplementing the ￿ndings of
Bornhorst et al (2009) with external corroboration of the hypothesised link between natural
resource rents and taxation using cross-country data. Taking data from the WDI across sub-
Saharan African countries from 1960 to date, I present the linear ￿t (with 95% con￿dence interval)
of natural resource rents and six measurements of aggregate taxation: tax revenue as a percentage
of GDP; net taxes on products; the average number of meetings between ￿rms and tax o¢ cials per
year; taxes on goods and services as a percentage of government revenue; taxes on international
11Mean for 2001, 2003 and 2005 is 26.9 (￿ = 3.51); the sample mean is 4.58 (￿ = 4.45).
13trade as a percentage of government revenue; and the total tax paid by businesses expressed as
a percentage of pro￿ts.12 With varying levels of statistical signi￿cance, each plot is suggestive
of a negative relationship. In Figure 2, I restrict the sample to include the 15 countries used
in the main analysis of this paper only, again from 1960 onwards. Again with varying levels of
con￿dence, the expected relationship holds in all but two cases: net taxes on products and taxes
on goods and services. In the ￿rst case, the apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that
the tax measure is on indirect taxes, which can be reasonably assumed to be less salient than
direct taxes. This would not be expected to a⁄ect the demand for democratic accountability. As
a result, the negative relationship with resource rents is not necessarily required to corroborate
the theory. Regarding the second case, the glossary of tax variable de￿nitions in Appendix A
shows that this measure includes taxes on the production and extraction of minerals, as well
as taxes on the pro￿ts of ￿scal monopolies. The positive relationship between this variable and
resource rents is thus hardly a confounding observation.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates: Rents, Taxation and Account-
ability
Table 3 shows the main results of the paper. In Column (1) we see the positive and signi￿cant
relationship between tax enforcement and the demand for democratic accountability. Column
(2) shows that the relationship is robust to the inclusion of individual, interview, time and
country-related controls. However, as discussed, this relationship is likely to be endogenous.
Columns (3) and (4) show the ￿rst stage results. Consistent with the theory, increases in
resource rents are found to reduce the level of tax enforcement. Again, the results are stable
when controls are added. The IV results presented in Columns (5) and (6) suggest that the
relationship between tax enforcement and the demand for democratic accountability is causal; a
one-point increase on the four-point tax enforcement scale raises the demand for accountability
by just under a third of a point on an equivalent scale when controls are included, and by around
an eighth of a point in their absence.13 In the both cases, the hypothesis that the instrument is
12These are de￿ned in Appendix A.
13That the instrument is measured at the country level necessitates special treatment of the standard error.
The relatively small number of clusters implies that a bootstrap of standard errors re-sampling at the country
level is theoretically more appropriate than clustering (Cameron et al, 2008). Results are robust to this.
14weak can be rejected (F = 95.02; 82.67).
The results in Columns (5) and (6) are subject to the suitability of the rents variable as
a valid instrument. Although the premise that it is weak can be rejected, the validity of the
other implicit assumption ￿that the instrument is independent of the error term ￿has to be
investigated. In order to do so, a second instrument is required. Once identi￿ed, it is then
possible to test whether the instruments are jointly valid; that is, that they are uncorrelated
with the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the main equation.
I test this by using measures of aid as an accompanying instrument. Aid represents a non-
salient, external ￿ ow of resources to leaders, and is thus likely to elicit behaviour analogous to that
predicted by increasing resource rents,14 albeit tempered by the role of NGOs and other outsiders
in the distribution process. Here, the data on aid is taken from the same WDI database as the
main instrument. I use aid per capita, where aid refers to both o¢ cial development assistance
(ODA) and o¢ cial aid, as well as aid as a percentage of government revenue.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows the e⁄ects of including aid as a percentage of government
expenditure as an instrument. The results are robust to the addition. Most importantly, however,
I ￿nd that the instruments are valid. The null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation cannot be rejected (overidenti￿cation test p-value = 0.17). However, the sample size is
signi￿cantly reduced due to a lack of available data. In Column (2) we see that the instrument
- this time aid per capita - is again uncorrelated with the error term. A note must go, however,
to the weak ￿rst stage e⁄ect of the second instrument (P = 0.21).
Another potential concern is that the variation of the resource-rent measure is merely captur-
ing a trend e⁄ect within each country. To check this, I include a country-speci￿c linear time trend
in Column (2) of Table 4. The results are not weakened. However, the inclusion of a country-level
trend variable presents collinearity issues in a model that already includes country ￿xed e⁄ects,
survey round ￿xed e⁄ects, two variables that vary at the country level (election proximity and
resource rents) and a linear time trend. I thus follow Eifert et al (2010) by favouring a linear
time trend to control for these e⁄ects.
14Gupta (2004) and Morrison (2009) both show empirical evidence of the negative relationship between foreign
aid ￿ows and domestic tax revenue.
15A number of other robustness checks were carried out. I allude above to the potential problems
that may arise due to the inclusion of Nigeria in the analysis, namely that high resource rents
may bias overall results. In Column (3) we see that results are robust to the exclusion of Nigerian
data. An added concern is that the linear speci￿cations used thus far may not suit the nature of
the data, and that, given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an alternative estimator
should be tried. I thus dichotomise the dependent variable by grouping each half of the four-point
scale into a single point in order to facilitate the estimation of the relationship using IV Probit
and Linear Probability Models (LPM). The resultant marginal e⁄ects shown in Table 5 continue
to corroborate the theory.15
Furthermore, results may be conditional on the operation of the speci￿c dependent variable
used to proxy the demand for accountability in this analysis. To check this, I replicate the
estimation using an alternative Afrobarometer question that could reasonably be expected to
capture the demand for democratic accountability:
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the
following alternatives?
Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.
As with the original measurement, I recode the variable so that the strongest level of demand
for accountability (i.e., disapproval of one-man rule) is at the higher end of the four-point scale
used to measure attitudes towards the statement. The variable is particularly appropriate as a
substitute for the original measurement given that it also provides respondents with the option to
eschew democratic elections, albeit in favour of a de￿ned alternative. Results in Table 6 reinforce
the original ￿ndings.
Two issues remain on the interpretation of these results. Firstly, Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith (2009) propose what could be construed as a competing hypothesis, whereby the response
of leaders to revolutionary threats vary with the source of central revenues. Governments with
access to external revenues such as resource rents or foreign aid reduce the provision of pub-
lic goods and increase repressive activities, while those who rely on revenues that derive from
15Multiplying linear probability estimates by 2.5 allows for a rough comparison with probit estimates (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2009). In this context, multiplying the linear estimate gives 2.5(0.145) = 0.3625. The probit estimate
is 0.376.
16citizens￿labour inputs are more likely to assuage the threats by providing public services and de-
mocratising. It could thus be argued that the returns to tax collecting activities in resource-rich
countries would diminish due to the negative impact of repression on productivity. However,
a reduction in tax enforcement that is caused by an increase in repressive activities is highly
unlikely to erode citizens￿demand for accountability - if anything, it would be expected to in-
crease the desire for clean elections. This hypothesis is thus inconsistent with the empirical
results. Secondly, it could be reasonably claimed that the e⁄ects of perceived tax enforcement on
the demand for democratic accountability are not homogeneous ￿some people may be a⁄ected
di⁄erently than others. In this context, it is perhaps most likely that individuals with higher
educational attainment are more sensitive to the e⁄ect. I thus test for heterogeneity across the
ten levels of education in the survey, ranging from no formal education (0) to post-graduate level
(9). Although I ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences for some categories, the e⁄ects are not concentrated at
either end of the distribution: the e⁄ects for people with primary education (3), some high school
education (4), post-secondary education excluding university (6), and university education (8)
are signi￿cantly higher than the e⁄ects for those with no formal education.16 Homogeneous ef-
fects across economic status could not be rejected (p = 0.27), nor could those for the rural-urban
background of respondents (p = 0.65). I conclude that the e⁄ects of tax enforcement on the
demand for accountability are largely homogeneous.
4.3 Rents, Taxes and Survival
Table 7 reports the ￿ndings of equation (7). The interaction term, although small in magnitude,
is signi￿cant and negative: tax enforcement is reduced in resource-rich countries as elections
become more proximate. The rents variable maintains its negative coe¢ cient and, as expected,
the e⁄ects of election proximity on tax enforcement (controlling for those that are associated with
increases in resource rents) are also negative. As rents increase, the illusory leader disengages
his citizenry by lowering tax enforcement.
16Coe¢ cients are 0.22***, 0.12*, 0.18* and 0.36*** respectively, where *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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In this paper I identify a mechanism that supports a political-economy explanation of the natural
resource curse in developing countries. Where resource rents increase, leaders soften the burden
of taxation on the citizenry as a means to render them more acquiescent. The ￿ndings are
corroborated by supplementary analyses of testable theoretical implications.
In the main analysis I use household survey data from 15 sub-Saharan countries. The IV
micro-level approach facilitates the identi￿cation of a speci￿c channel through which the curse can
operate. However, this approach also imposes a considerable constraint on the data, as country-
level temporal variation is required when controlling for country ￿xed e⁄ects. The opportunity
to exploit variation in natural resource data from more than 33 survey rounds would therefore be
one way to reinforce the results. Another valuable addition to the area would be made possible
by the availability of data on tax payments at the individual level as an alternative to perceptions
of tax enforcement.
Furthermore, it is important to note that this mechanism plays a part of a bigger story,
namely that it facilitates political malfeasance in the form of patronage politics and resource
embezzlement. This is key to understanding whether or not this behaviour leads to the natural
resource curse. As I mention in the main analysis, Collier and Hoe› er (2009) show that weak
accountability in resource-rich democracies leads to a reduction in growth, suggesting that this is
indeed the case. Nevertheless, analysing the channel in this context would constitute a valuable
extension.
Turning to policy implications, a recent World Bank proposal (Devarajan et al, 2010) outlines
a way in which the cycle identi￿ed in this paper can be mitigated, namely by directly transferring
resource revenues to citizens before taxing a proportion of it back. Though an assessment of this
speci￿c proposal is beyond the remit of this study, the ￿ndings I report in this paper reinforce the
movement to strengthen accountability in resource-rich countries, as re￿ ected by the emergence of
international protocols such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Natural
Resource Charter. Although the vital import of democratic accountability as an accompaniment
to electoral competition cannot be understated for any sub-Saharan African country, it should
be noted that resource-rich countries are particularly prone to institutional deterioration as a
18result of citizen acquiescence through a decrease in the tax burden ￿where checks and balances
are most needed, they are perhaps at their most delicate.
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Botswana 2003 0:13 0:08 0:28 0:51 3:14
Botswana 2005 0:05 0:09 0:3 0:56 3:1
Cape Verde 2002 0:06 0:17 0:33 0:44 3:22
Cape Verde 2005 0:08 0:1 0:25 0:57 3:41
Ghana 2002 0:04 0:05 0:27 0:64 3:31
Ghana 2005 0:04 0:04 0:34 0:58 3:28
Kenya 2003 0:05 0:05 0:21 0:69 3:16
Kenya 2005 0:03 0:07 0:26 0:64 3:16
Lesotho 2003 0:17 0:14 0:34 0:35 3:52
Lesotho 2005 0:12 0:11 0:2 0:57 3:2
Malawi 2003 0:14 0:06 013 0:67 3:46
Malawi 2005 0:34 0:03 0:03 0:6 3:35
Mali 2003 0:09 0:07 0:33 0:51 3:54
Mali 2005 0:06 0:08 0:45 0:41 3:28
Mozambique 2002 0:08 0:1 0:41 0:41 3:31
Mozambique 2005 0:07 0:08 0:31 0:54 3:3
Namibia 2001 0:05 0:08 0:24 0:63 3:16
Namibia 2003 0:04 0:13 0:31 0:52 3:51
Namibia 2006 0:07 0:21 0:26 0:46 3:31
Nigeria 2001 0:05 0:08 0:27 0:6 3:37
Nigeria 2003 0:07 0:1 0:3 0:53 2:87
Nigeria 2005 0:1 0:14 0:26 0:5 3:16
Senegal 2003 0:11 0:09 0:3 0:5 3:46
Senegal 2005 0:02 0:06 0:46 0:46 3:54
South Africa 2002 0:07 0:09 0:32 0:52 3:22
South Africa 2004 0:08 0:09 0:29 0:54 3:31
South Africa 2006 0:06 0:08 0:36 0:5 3:38
Tanzania 2003 0:12 0:09 0:28 0:51 3:33
Tanzania 2005 0:06 0:03 0:22 0:69 3:51
Uganda 2002 0:11 0:06 0:18 0:65 2:89
Uganda 2005 0:05 0:06 0:22 0:67 3:21
Zambia 2003 0:15 0:08 0:19 0:58 3:27
Zambia 2005 0:05 0:07 0:32 0:56 3:39
Mean 0:09 0:09 0:28 0:55 3:29
Standard Deviation 0:04 0:03 0:06 0:07 0:12
Notes: A = We should choose our leaders in this country through regular,
open and honest elections; B = Since elections sometimes produce bad re-
sults, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country￿ s leaders.
"Agree with Neither," "Don￿ t Know" and refusals all treated as missing val-
ues. These values collectively account for 1407 observations in the total
sample of 50755.
22Table 2: Sample Country Statistics






Botswana 2003 3976 3.36 . 2 16
Botswana 2005 4336 3.52 . 3 -7
Cape Verde 2002 1269 3.13 . 0 -16
Cape Verde 2005 1357 3.42 20.4 0 10
Ghana 2002 264 3.42 17.5 6 -21
Ghana 2005 290 3.49 21.3 5 -3.5
Kenya 2003 404 3.19 15.8 1 -8
Kenya 2005 426 3.58 18.6 1 27.5
Lesotho 2003 437 2.93 37.3 2 -9
Lesotho 2005 453 3.67 44.3 1 18.5
Malawi 2003 134 3.2 . 1 12.5
Malawi 2005 138 3.51 . 1 -13.5
Mali 2003 278 2.94 13.8 0 -6.5
Mali 2005 284 3.34 15.7 0 22
Mozambique 2002 270 3.31 . 1 27.5
Mozambique 2005 312 3.17 . 5 -6.5
Namibia 2001 2067 2.82 29.5 0 -28
Namibia 2003 2194 2.97 25.9 0 14.5
Namibia 2006 2603 3.19 . 4 -15
Nigeria 2001 370 3.11 . 26 19.5
Nigeria 2003 394 3.04 . 23 -6
Nigeria 2005 438 3.08 . 30 19.5
Senegal 2003 492 3.21 . 0 -19
Senegal 2005 522 3.43 . 0 17
South Africa 2002 3128 3.09 24.2 4 18.5
South Africa 2004 3302 2.71 25.7 4 -6
South Africa 2006 3570 3.11 28.8 4 -22.5
Tanzania 2003 296 3.17 . 2 29
Tanzania 2005 321 3.62 . 3 4.5
Uganda 2002 266 3.28 11.1 5 -18.5
Uganda 2005 291 3.46 11.8 4 10
Zambia 2003 329 3.3 16.7 3 -16.5
Zambia 2005 348 3.48 17.8 10 14
Mean 1078 3.25 22.01 4.58 15.24
Standard Deviation 1031.91 0.19 6.85 4.45 7.24
Notes: GDP pc is measured in 2000 US$. Tax Enforcement is the mean score on
a four point scale (1-4) given by respondents in each survey round to the question
shown in Section 3.1. Tax Revenue is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Rents
are natural resource rents expressed as a percentage of GNI. Data on GDP pc, tax
revenue and resource rents are taken from the World Development Indicators. Elec-
toral Proximity is number of months between the survey and the most proximate
national elections.





1st Stage 1st Stage 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Dem a/c Dem a/c Tax Tax Dem a/c Dem a/c
Instrument: Rents Rents
Tax 0.0655*** 0.0649*** 0.1274* 0.3191***




Individual No Yes No Yes No Yes
Interview No Yes No Yes No Yes
Election Proximity No Yes No Yes No Yes
Survey Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46832 45270 47957 46276 46832 45270
R-Squared 0.023 0.033 0.061 0.067
1st Stage F-stat. 95.02 82.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All models include population weights (de￿ned as 1
nc, where ncis the total number
of observations from that country).
24Table 4: Robustness Checks
Over ID Test Country Time
Trend
Excl. Nigeria
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Dem a/c Dem a/c Dem a/c Dem a/c
Instruments: Rents; Aid/GE Rents; Aid PC Rents Rents
Tax 0.160* 0.331*** 0.568*** 0.3***
(0.094) (0.111) (0.062) (0.091)
Controls
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview Yes Yes Yes Yes
Election Proximity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Time Trend Yes Yes Dropped Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Time Trend No No Yes No
Observations 24998 45270 45270 45270
Test for Overidenti￿cation






Aid / GE -0.003***
(0.001)
F-stat. 20.05 51.57 . 33.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All models include population weights (de￿ned as 1
nc, where ncis the total number of
observations from that country) with the exception of (1). Test of overidentifying restrictions
interpreted as follows: The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorre-
lated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the
estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the num-
ber of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments.
Here, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
25Table 5: Binary Dependent Variable Models
IV Probit LPM
(1) (2)







Election Proximity Yes Yes
Survey Round Yes Yes
Linear Time Trend Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 45720 45720
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include population weights (de￿ned as 1
nc, where
ncis the total number of observations from that country). Dependent
variable is a dichotomous variation of the main measurement for the
demand for democratic accountability, where the higher and lower
two points on the Likert scale are bundled into single points (0/1)
to create a binary variable. Coe¢ cients reported represent marginal
e⁄ects (dy/dx)
26Table 6: Models with an Alternative Dependent Variable
2SLS IV Probit IV LPM
(1) (2) (3)






Instrument: Rents Rents Rents
Tax 0.619*** 0.443** 0.246***
(0.111) (0.209) (0.039)
Controls
Individual Yes Yes Yes
Interview Yes Yes Yes
Election Proximity Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Yes Yes Yes
Linear Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44490 40746 40746
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Notes: All models include population weights (de￿ned as 1
nc, where ncis the
total number of observations from that country). First-stage results as in Table
3. Coe¢ cients reported in (2) and (3) represent marginal e⁄ects (dy/dx).

















Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Model includes population weights
(de￿ned as 1
nc, where ncis the total num-
ber of observations from that country).
28Figure 1: Taxes and Natural Resources in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960 - 2009
29Figure 2: Taxes and Natural Resources in Sample Countries, 1960 - 2009.
30Appendix A: Macro Tax Variable De￿nitions (Source: World
Bank)
Tax Revenue Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for public
purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as ￿nes, penalties, and most social security contri-
butions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated
as negative revenue.
Net Tax on Products Net taxes on products (net indirect taxes) are the sum of product taxes
less subsidies. Product taxes are those taxes payable by producers that relate to the production,
sale, purchase or use of the goods and services. Subsidies are grants on the current account made
by general government to private enterprises and unincorporated public enterprises. The grants
may take the form of payments to ensure a guaranteed price or to enable maintenance of prices of
goods and services below costs of production, and other forms of assistance to producers. Data
are in current U.S. dollars.
Meetings with Tax O¢ cials These ￿gures show the average number of days ￿rms spent in
inspections and mandatory meetings with tax o¢ cials in the last two years.
Tax on Goods and Services Taxes on goods and services include general sales and turnover
or value added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use of
goods or property, taxes on extraction and production of minerals, and pro￿ts of ￿scal monopo-
lies.
Taxes on International Trade Taxes on international trade include import duties, export
duties, pro￿ts of export or import monopolies, exchange pro￿ts, and exchange taxes.
Total Tax Rate Total tax rate is the total amount of taxes payable by businesses (except for
labour taxes) after accounting for deductions and exemptions as a percentage of pro￿t.
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